Rise of Russian Business Elite Essay Example

Rise of Russian Business Elite Essay Example Rise of Russian Business Elite Essay Rise of Russian Business Elite Essay Communist and Post-Communist Studies 38 (2005) 293e307 www. elsevier. com/locate/postcomstud The rise of the Russian business elite Olga Kryshtanovskaya a, Stephen White b,* a Institute of Sociology, Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow, Russia b Department of Politics, University of Glasgow, Glasgow, UK Available online 24 August 2005 Abstract The early 1990s saw the formation of a new group of Russian property owners, often derivative of the late Soviet nomenklatura. The richest and most in? uential were known as oligarchs, and they established a dominant position in the later years of the Yeltsin presidency. Only 15% of the 1993 business elite still retained their position by 2001, after the 1998 devaluation of the currency. Those who took their place were younger, less metropolitan, better educated and more likely to have a background in government, including many who had enjoyed ministerial status. The new business elite is less personally ambitious, but its political in? uence is no less considerable and its representation in decision-making bodies has more than doubled over the post-communist period. The logic of development is towards a concentration of economic power in the hands of 20e25 large conglomerates in a politically subordinate association with government, along South Korean lines. O 2005 Published by Elsevier Ltd on behalf of The Regents of the University of California. Keywords: Business; Elite; Oligarchy; Russia Introduction The Soviet system allowed di? erences of income and private accumulations of wealth. But it did not permit the private ownership of factories and farms, or even of * Corresponding author. Tel. : C44 141 330 5352; fax: C44 141 330 5071. E-mail address: s. [emailprotected] gla. ac. uk (S. White). 967-067X/$ see front matter O 2005 Published by Elsevier Ltd on behalf of The Regents of the University of California. doi:10. 1016/j. postcomstud. 2005. 06. 002 294 O. Kryshtanovskaya, S. White / Communist and Post-Communist Studies 38 (2005) 293e307 small businesses; living o? the labour of others was ‘exploitation’, and a criminal o? ence . These restrictions were being relaxed even before the end of communist rule, and a central feature of the policies that were followed under Boris Yeltsin after his election as Russia’s ? rst president in the summer of 1991 was the shift of productive resources from the state to private individuals. We must’, Yeltsin insisted, ‘provide economic freedom, lift all barriers to the freedom of enterprises and of entrepreneurship and give people the opportunity to work and to receive as much as they can, casting o? all bureaucratic constraints’ (Yeltsin, 1992: p. 6). In line with these policies, successive programmes of privatisation transferred state property into private hands; income di? erentials widened rapidly; and at the top, a new group of super-rich emerged, whose assets commanded respect not just within Russia itself but internationally. They became known as the ‘oligarchs’, with resources that typically combined banking, sections of industry and the mass media. 1 There were 15 of these wealthy magnates, and every Russian knew their names: Rem Vyakhirev, Boris Berezovsky, Vladimir Gusinsky, Vagit Alekperov, Vladimir Potanin, Mikhail Fridman, Mikhail Khodorkovsky and others. For 3 years, from 1995 to 1998, their power and their ratings rose steadily. Within government itself they had their ‘own’ ministers, o? cials and deputies. Berezovsky claimed personally to have secured the re-election of Boris Yeltsin in 1996 through the media campaign he had sponsored (Financial Times 1 November 1996: p. 17). He was known to be a member of the ‘Family’, the inner group around Yeltsin’s younger daughter who appeared to exercise decisive in? uence in the presidential court. Indeed it began to appear as if the state itself had been ‘privatised’, and that all important decisions were being taken by a small group of ? nancial magnates. It was certainly true that many of the country’s key positions were occupied by creatures of the major corporations, and that Duma parties were ? ling their foreign accounts by pushing through the kind of agreements the oil barons found most advantageous; some even did well out of the Chechen war. Who, asked analysts, really ruled the countrydpoliticians or businessmen? The crisis of August 1998, when Russia defaulted on its international debts and the rouble was in e? ect devalued, had profound e? ects throughout Russian public life, and no less upon its social structure. Some of the oligarchs were ruined (including Vladimir Vinogradov of Inkombank and Alexander Smolensky of SBSAgro); a few withdrew from public life, and others sought refuge abroad. Equally, There is already a considerable literature. In English, see for instance Khlebnikov (2000), Silverman and Yanowitch (2000), Rutland (2001), Ho? man (2002), and de Vries et al. (2004). In Russian, see Kukolev (1995a, b, 1996), Kryshtanovskaya (1996, 2002a, b) (on which we have drawn), Pappe (2000), and Mukhin (2001, 2004). The research that is reported in this paper was assisted by the Economic and Social Research Council under grant R000220127 in association with the Ministry of Defence under grant JGC902. Research on Russian business leaders has been conducted in the Elites Department of the Institute of Sociology of the Russian Academy of Sciences on the basis of a consistent methodology since 1993. In each case, an expert survey is used to identify a number of named members of the business elite (in 1993 there were 115 such names, and in 2001 there were 119); in a second stage, the biographies of these entrepreneurs are subjected to a more detailed analysis on the basis of interview as well as published data. 1 O. Kryshtanovskaya, S. White / Communist and Post-Communist Studies 38 (2005) 293e307 295 here were changes in the relationship between government and the business elite, particularly after the election of Vladimir Putin as president in March 2000, as the regime began to pursue a policy of ‘equal distancing’ towards them. Putin, indeed, had promised that any ‘power-hungry’ oligarchs would ‘cease to exist as a class’ (Segodnya 20 March 20 00: p. 1). But what did this mean? The beginning of a struggle by the state with the oligarchy as a whole, or just with individual oligarchs? And did this mean that private business was beginning to play a smaller role in Russian politics, or, on the contrary, that its power had increased? In what follows we look ? rst at the emergence of the business elite, and then at the structural changes that have followed the collapse of the currency. We argue that over the whole period there has been a renegotiation, but not a dissolution, of the interpenetration of business and government that de? nes an oligarchy. Identifying the business elite We de? ne the business elite as the top echelon of entrepreneurs, who thanks to their ? nancial and economic resources have a signi? cant in? uence on the taking of decisions of national importance. The business elite, for our purposes, are a much more restricted group than the country’s major businessmen, including the largest shareholders (and sometimes top managers) of the leading enterprises and banks. The owners of some Russian corporations prefer to keep their distance from politics, although the scale of their business may be very substantial. And there are others for whom politics may be their main activity. Corporations of the ? rst kind can have considerable in? uence on the national economy; corporations of the second type have more in? uence on political decision-makers, and their role in the economy itself may not be signi? ant. In other words, the possession of substantial capital is a necessary but not su? cient criterion for membership of the business elite. 2 At a certain stage in the Russian reforms the business elite could have been regarded as a part of the ruling group of the society, a result not just of the resources they controlled and their degree of in? uence, but also of their origins. The ‘Komsomol economy’ in which the current business elite originated was a creation of the Soviet nomenklatura, which became the basis for the formation of a Russian property-owning class (Mawdsley and White, 2000: pp. 95e299; Martynova, 2001: ch. 4). The relative youth of individual members of the business elite in these early Our de? nition is close to that of other scholars. For the Russian Sociological Dictionary, for instance, the ‘economic elite’ should be understood as the ‘people who control the main ? nancial-economic structures of a country independent of judicial forms of ownership’; they may be divided into the directors of state enterprises, and the ‘business elite’ proper (Osipov, 1998 p. 638). For Ashin and colleagues, the business elite is the ‘top stratum of the entrepreneurial-? ancial group of the society’ (Ashin et al. , 1999: p. 294). Zaslavskaya de? nes à ¢â‚¬Ëœoligarchs’ as ‘not only owners, but also authorised executives and those who hold signi? cant numbers of shares of the major national and international corporations, holdings and industrial-? nancial groups’ (Zaslavskaya, 2004: p. 370). There has been considerable controversy in Russian sociology about de? nitions of this kind: see for instance Toshchenko (1999). 2 296 O. Kryshtanovskaya, S. White / Communist and Post-Communist Studies 38 (2005) 293e307 eform years should not mislead us: the nomenklatura exchanged power for property, without necessarily engaging themselves in commercial activities. For the conduct of business of this kind they recruited younger associates, who were able to make use of government revenues to support their commercial initiatives. These younger associates were recruited from the party’s ‘reserve’, the Komsomol, who represented the lower level of the party-state bureaucracy in the Soviet period. Both before and after the crisis of 1998 there was a fairly substantial group of people who had a noticeable in? ence on public policy, thanks to their ? nancial resources. Their money gave them control of mass communications, the ability to fund election campaigns, assist parties and ‘purchase’ deputies, and to lobby government directly. Russia was not unusual in these respects: in the early twentieth century Michels had already formulated his ‘iron law of oligarchy’ according to which a democracy, in order to preserve itself and achieve a degree of stability, is obliged to separate out a more active minority element, or elite. For this reason, according to Michels (1959: p. 7), democracy inevitably turned into oligarchy. Writing subsequently, Miriam Beard claimed that the opportunity to achieve power was at the same time an opportunity to acquire wealth, since there were no obstacles with society that prevent the rich acquiring power for instance, through their ability to spend at election time (Beard, 1938: p. 166). Oligarchy may be de? ned as a state formation in which the major owners have not only economic power, but also enormous political in? uence. They take part in the formation of government and at the same time receive privileges from government, on which their wellbeing is dependent. An oligarchy is based on the interaction of two elite groups: the political ‘establishment’, which is ? nanced by big business and provide it with access to the most pro? table forms of entrepreneurship, and businessmen themselves. The interpenetration of power and property is expressed in the constant bargaining that takes place between both sets of actors, including the ? ? ? lling of key positions. Businessmen bring their proteges into government, and politicians after their resignation ? nd refuge in private corporations, bringing with them as a form of capital their wide network of contacts. In an oligarchic state the distance between state power and big business is minimal: it is a narrow circle in which everyone knows everyone else (Kryshtanovskaya, 1996). A de? nition of oligarchy of this kind is close but not quite identical to the one that was most widely employed in the Russian press during the 1990s, in which 10e15 businessmen were regularly named in this capacity. Unlike journalists, for whom a situational and individual analysis is important, the social scienti? c approach is a di? erent one: the oligarchy is considered as a social group whose personal composition has no particular signi? ance other than as a basis for constructing the sample to be examined. For these purposes the oligarchy is faceless, and not dependent on the replacement of one name by anotherda Gusinsky, for instance, by an Abramovich. What is at issue is not a list of the individually important, but the social relationship between the two groups who continue to constitute the Russian elite: politicians and businessmen. Accordingly, the downfall of individual oligarchs may represent not the weakening, but the strengthening of the oligarchy as a larger entity. O. Kryshtanovskaya, S. White / Communist and Post-Communist Studies 38 (2005) 293e307 297 The origins of the business elite Russia’s developing bourgeoisie has been the object of close attention over the entire post-communist period (for the use of this term see Gill, 1998). But interest was at its highest point immediately before the August 1998 crisis when it seemed that the country was being run, not by a disorganised elite under the guidance of a decrepit president, but by a small group of nouveau-riche tycoons. These were the ‘real government of Russia’, in the view of the Financial Times (K’eza, 1997: p. 98). The sociologist Tat’yana Zaslavskaya (1997: p. 54) described them as a ‘renewed oligarchy’ made up of the ‘most competent or fortunate members of the nomenklatura’, with no less power and a good deal more wealth than their Soviet predecessors. Just seven of them, according to Berezovsky himself, controlled half of the entire Russian eco nomy (Financial Times 1 November 1996: p. 17). The in? uence of this small group of Moscow businessmen steadily increased at the same time as the state itself began to disintegrate, and the country’s economic position deteriorated further. Russia’s oligarchy received an important stimulus in 1995 when the government decided to give private business the shares of major enterprises in exchange for their ? nancial support (Freeland, 2000). The debt auctions were a Rubicon separating two stages in the formation of the business elite. Up to this point the business elite consisted of ? nanciers who had enormous in? uence in the political world, but their role in the Russian economy was not particularly signi? cant. There was not much incentive to invest in industries that needed extensive modernisation before they could start to yield a pro? . After the Russian government had approved the principle of debt auctions major ? nanciers were able to invest their money more advantageously, strengthening their position in politics and in the economy. In this way, the owners of the banks that were allowed to engage in these activities in the mid-1990s became a group with genuine, rather than virtual economic power. Now their political authority was determined not by their connections in the corridors of power, but also by their real economic weight. The process by which the role of the major businessmen in society increased was clearly re? cted in the ratings of the country’s most in? uential public ? gures that appear regularly in the newspaper Nezavisimaya gazeta, based on expert surveys. The ? rst businessmen appeared in the list in 1996 (see Table 1). By 1997 they had achieved their maximum in? uence, and the leader of the groupdBoris Berezovskydwas regularly identi? ed as one of the country’s half-dozen most powerful individuals. One of the oligarchs, the head of Al’fa Bank Mikhail Fridman, spoke in this sense in an interview in 1997, soon after President Yeltsin had received him and his colleagues in the Kremlin. Imagine’, as he put it, ‘if President Gorbachev had met a businessman or two, it would have been meaningless, because their social status was so di? eren t. Just the fact that the meeting with Yeltsin took place shows how complete is the change in place and role of the business community in our social hierarchy. Now we occupy a very prestigious place’ (interview, 1997). In the ? rst years of their existence the oligarchs were a fairly small and united group, who represented not so much the entrepreneurial class as a whole as their own 298 O. Kryshtanovskaya, S. White / Communist and Post-Communist Studies 38 (2005) 293e307 Table 1 Oligarchs and their in? uence, 1996e2000 1996 1. Berezovsky B. A. 2. Potanin V. O. 3. Vyakhirev R. I. 4. Gusinsky V. A. 5. Khodorkovsky M. B. 6. Alekperov V. Yu. 7. Fridman M. M. 8. Aven P. I. 9. Abramovich R. A. 10. Mamut M. A. 11. Smolensky A. P. 12. Vinogradov V. V. 13. Nevzlin L. B. 14. Yevtushenkov V. No. of oligarchs included Average rating 98 84 e e e e e e e e e e e e 2 91 1997 6 20 13 15 28 25 e e e e 26 55 e e 8 24 1998 4 19 8 15 25 23 59 e e e 31 51 90 e 10 33 1999 5 53 12 19 72 26 94 98 29 e e e e 36 10 44 2000 4 47 7 15 60 26 54 39 5 21 e e e e 10 28 Source: Adapted from data supplied by the Vox Populi agency, as published regularly in Nezavisimaya gazeta; the list shows the place of Russian businessmen within the country’s 100 most in? uential individuals, in descending order of magnitude. narrowly corporate interests. Even their lobbying was directed not so much towards the adoption of laws in which Russian capital as a whole had a signi? cant stake, but towards the receipt of speci? c privileges for their own ? rms. The best known of the ? rst-wave oligarchs attempted not so much to de? ne the political direction of the country as to monitor personnel changes in the government. The idea of the allpowerful nature of the oligarchs in 1995e1996, indeed, was a myth that had been blown up by the media, and their real in? uence on politics was much more limited. The television executive Igor Malashenko, who had joined Yeltsin’s re-election campaign sta? in 1996, insisted later that stories about the ‘incredible power of the oligarchs’ were ‘pure nonsense’, and often encouraged by the oligarchs themselves to exaggerate the in? uence they could command (Nezavisimaya gazeta 3 June 1998: p. 8; Schroder, 1999). But behind the empty newspaper phrases a real process was ? oing on, marking the advance of an entire entrepreneurial class. The oligarchs of 1995e1997 were ambitious and naive. They enriched themselves so quickly that they began to su? er from what Stalin had called the ‘dizziness with success’; in particular, they engaged in open political adventures. They became deputies without any di? culty (which had the welco me advantage that it gave them immunity from prosecution). A few even stood for the presidency in 1991 (manager and banker Martin Shakkum), and again in 1996 (pharmaceuticals magnate Viktor Bryntsalov). But it soon became clear that politics was an expensive game for a business elite that had not yet established its own position, and the frontal attacks of the new Russians were succeeded by attempts to in? uence politics in a more systematic but indirect way. The business elite began to use the media for its purposes, as well as the opposition, trade unions and state o? cials. They started to O. Kryshtanovskaya, S. White / Communist and Post-Communist Studies 38 (2005) 293e307 299 buy insider information so as to use it in their business activities, and to in? ence the taking of particular economic decisions. The ? rst multimillionaires emerged at a time of considerable instability in the country’s power structures, and rose quickly to the very top. They understood all the advantages of their position as businessmen-politicians and played a dangerous game, ? nancing political organisations and the mass media. Their rise coincided with the privatisation of state property and w as accelerated by the re-election of Boris Yeltsin in 1996; afterwards, some of the most prominent oligarchs formed a part of the Kremlin ‘Family’ itself. Pappe, one of the ? rst to study this process, has argued that ‘Up to 1998 all the most powerful economic groupings increased their resources as compared with those available to the power structures’. But from the end of the year and particularly after the August ? nancial crisis the whole process ‘went into reverse’, and soon there was not a single industrial group (with the possible exception of the massive gas corporation Gazprom) that was in a position to in? uence government or even deal with it on equal terms (Pappe, 2000: p. 46). The August crisis and the fall of the oligarchs The August crisis of 1998 and the sudden devaluation of the rouble that accompanied it led to an upheaval in the entire society, including the business elite. Indeed, on our evidence, only 15% of the 1993 business elite had retained their position by 2001. There are several reasons for this far-reaching turnover. In the ? rst place, there had been structural changes in the volatile Russian market. If before 1998 it had been dominated by ? nancial structures (banks, exchanges and investment corporations), after the crisis their role signi? cantly contracted. The speculative sector of the economy was almost destroyed by the August crisis, and did not recover. Goods exchanges, which at one time had ? ourished, disappeared almost entirely, and the number of banks fell sharply. But in the post-crisis period industrial enterprises emerged much more prominently, and they have continued to do so. These changes were re? ected in the composition of the business elite, which came increasingly to consist of entrepreneurs (by 2001 they accounted for as much as 64% of the total). What happened to the 85% of the 1993 business elite who had not retained their position in 2001? According to our evidence, most entrepreneurs who had been members of the 1993 business elite retained their positions in business (52%), but in many cases their scale of activity no longer allowed them to be included in the list of the country’s leading businessmen. Of the remainder, 6% became professional politicians and by 2001 were working full-time in parliament or in government. Nine percent had retired on a pension; these were mostly bankers who had headed commercial, formerly state banks in the early years of economic reform. A further 10% of the 1993 business elite had moved abroad, for the most part in order to protect their personal security, and two had been killed: the head of the Russian Business Round Table Ivan Kivelidi, and the head of the ‘21st Century Association’ Otari Kvantrishvili. 300 O. Kryshtanovskaya, S. White / Communist and Post-Communist Studies 38 (2005) 293e307 There were related changes in the kinds of individuals that composed the business elite. A comparison of the data for 1993 and 2001 makes clear that it has become somewhat younger; its average age fell to 48. years as compared with 51. 8 years in 1993, shortly after the end of communist rule. As before, it is an overwhelminglydindeed exclusivelydmale group. A quarter of the business elite of 2001, fewer than before, came from Moscow or St Petersburg, rather more are from other cities (33%), and even more came from small towns or villages (42%). The reason for the greater provincialism of the business elite is the structural changes that have taken place in its composition; Moscow ? nanciers have to a large extent been replaced by regional industrialists. The occupational and educational background of the business elite has also been changing. In 1993 it was typical to enter business from science as well as industry itself, but by 2001 it was more common to migrate from the state service as well as industry (see Table 2). The entrepreneurs of 2001 were also more educated than their predecessors: just 3% had two degrees in 1993 but now 13% have a second quali? cation, often in law. The social and professional background of the new business elite leaves little doubt that it is still closely connected with the political elite of the Soviet period. Some 29% of the current business elite, for instance, belonged to the Soviet nomenklatura, a ? gure that was actually somewhat higher than it had been 8 years earlier in the immediate aftermath of communist rule. Similar processes have been identi? ed on the basis of survey evidence (Chernysh, 1994; Eyal et al. , 1998). But while the business elite of 1993 were typically of Komsomol origin, now the main source of recruitment of the business elite is government ministries (Table 3). Immediately before they entered the business elite, its members were enterprise directors (25%), state o? ials (20%), employees of private ? rms (27%), sta? from state banks (6%), and others. This was a career progression that was characteristic of the post-communist period. Formerly, the usual retirement destination of a senior public ? gure was the diplomatic service. Now, more often than not, former state o? cials after their retirement become top managers in major corporations. This tendency ? rst made itself apparent in 1992e1993, when a series of members of the government moved to work in commercial structures. They included Petr Aven, who moved from the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations to the Table 2 Origins of the Russian business elite, 1993e2001 Sphere of activity Industry Science Culture and education Study [ ] State banks State service Other (N ) 1993 35 26 15 0 17 0 39 (115) 2001 50 14 4 13 7 16 30 (131) Source: Authors’ data. The totals include all the spheres in which the respective business elite were active; ‘study’ indicates direct entry into the business elite on completion of higher education. O. Kryshtanovskaya, S. White / Communist and Post-Communist Studies 38 (2005) 293e307 Table 3 Nomenklatura origins of the Russian business elite, 1993e2001 (percentages) 1993 No nomenklatura background Nomenklatura background Of which: Komsomol apparatus CPSU apparatus Soviet executives Senior ministerial positions 76 24 11 4 5 10 301 2001 71 29 7 4 5 12 Source: As Table 2. Those with a nomenklatura background in 1993 exceed the total shown as many members of the business elite worked in more than one position of this kind. residency of Al’fa Bank; Maksim Boiko, who left the State Property Commission to become general director of the advertising group Video International; and Viktor Ilyushin, the former head of Yeltsin’s presidential sta? and then a ? rst deputy prime minister, who moved into the state gas monopoly Gazprom. In other movements, Andrei Kozyrev went from the Foreign Ministry to the American company ICN Pharmaceuticals; Petr Mostovoi moved from the Federal Ban kruptcy Service to become ? rst vice-president of the diamond company Alrosa; Alfred Kokh, who had been ? st deputy chairman of the State Property Commission and deputy premier, became head of the Montes Auri company; and Oleg Sysuev, who had been deputy prime minister and before that mayor of Samara, became vice-president of Al’fa Bank. Subsequently the process became a much more general one. Over the entire post-communist period there have been substantial changes in the way in which the country’s leading entrepreneurs have entered business. In 1993e 1995 the most common way of establishing a successful commercial company was the creation by a state o? cial of a ? rm into which he could move directly. We call this process ‘moving chairs’; it was one of the ways in which the former ruling group exchanged their power for property. Instead of the ‘diplomatic exile’ of the Soviet period, a new means of retirement developeddmoving into business. Firms that were set up on this basis soon ? lled up with highly placed retirees. As we were frequently told in our interviews with former party o? cials and the senior sta? of government ministries, only ‘our own people’ were given appointments in ? rms of this kind, which had typically evolved from ministries and government bodies of the Soviet period. The next most common means of exchanging power for property was when a state body delegated the right to conduct commercial activity to its authorised representatives. The leading positions in these companies were then ? lled with young people who were not directly related to the Soviet nomenklatura, or who held only junior positions within it. And ? nally, the third common means of establishing a successful business was the privatisation of former state enterprises. In most cases 3 We rely in this instance on the interviews conducted for our ‘Transformation of the Russian elite’ project between 2000 and 2004 (450 interviews). 02 O. Kryshtanovskaya, S. White / Communist and Post-Communist Studies 38 (2005) 293e307 the enterprise that had become a joint stock company did not change its managers (or did not do so immediately) and the director remained at his post, no longer simply the manager but now the owner of the enterprise over which he presided. In 1993 the most characteristic route into business was through the creation of a ? rm of one’s own by the use of o? cial position (57% of the business elite); by 2001 it was more common for members of the business elite to create their own ? ms through the privatisation of state enterprises (39%). Business and politics After the crisis, not only the business elite had changed: its in? uence upon the political process had also changed. The ‘old’ oligarchs of the Yeltsin period retired into the shadows, yielding their place to a new generation of entrepreneurs. These ‘new Russians’ were more provincial, more closely associated with domestic industry, and not so naively ambitious. The insecurity of the ? rst-wave oligarchs, who had su? ered because of their proximity to the regime, taught them to be cautious. The new oligarchs avoided public life and boasting about their wealth, but sought to establish ? rmer, less conspicuous relations with the authorities at all levels, acting more often than not through intermediaries. The destruction of the media empires of Berezovsky and Gusinsky, both of whom had been forced into exile, made it clear that the post-Yeltsin regime would not allow itself to be blackmailed, and that only groups that cooperated with government would be allowed to acquire important media holdings. The new motto was loyalty. But these changes in the political context did not mean that entrepreneurs withdrew into obscurity. Their in? uence changed in form, but all the same remained signi? cant. It was no longer individual mavericksdthe Borovois, Bryntsalovs and Berezovskysdwho stood out on the political arena, but a series of more shadowy ? gures representing the most powerful corporationsdGazprom, Lukoil, Yukos, Al’fa and so forth. Of the ‘old’ oligarchy, only the Al’fa group were still well represented on the political scene in the early years of the new century; two of its senior managers, for instance, took positions as deputy heads of the presidential administration in 1999 (Vyacheslav Surkov and Sergei Abramov). Al’fa people accounted at this time for an entire contingent of the presidential administration on Old Square in Moscow, where they occupied key positions as high-level consultants or department heads. However, notwithstanding the fact that the personal in? uence of the ? rst-wave oligarchs declined considerably, the role of major businessmen in society tended to increase still further. In Table 4 we set out our evidence for the Yeltsin (1993) and Putin (2001, 2003) leaderships, examining the proportion of key decision-making positions that are held by individuals from the world of big business in each of these periods. In almost every category the proportion of business representatives has increased and across all categories the representation of business more than trebled, reaching a remarkable 20% of government ministers. The minister of fuel and energy, for instance, was a representative of Yukos in 1998e1999 (Sergei Generalov), and was O. Kryshtanovskaya, S. White / Communist and Post-Communist Studies 38 (2005) 293e307 Table 4 Business representation in elite groups (percentages) Top leadership Yeltsin cohort (1993) Putin cohort (2001) Putin cohort (2003) Source: As Table 2. 2. 3 15. 7 9. 1 Duma deputies 12. 8 17. 3 17. Government 0. 0 4. 2 20. 0 Regional elite 2. 6 8. 1 12. 5 303 Overall 4. 4 9. 3 14. 7 a representative of Lukoil in 2000 (Alexander Gavrin). Another ? gure from the Al’fa group, Andrei Popov, was head of the territorial department of the presidential administration, where he served side by side with his Al’fa colleagues Surkov and Abramov. Business in the Russian regions The oligarchy strengthened its position even more considerably in the Russian regions than in the federal centre. The crisis that followed the collapse of the currency in August 1998 a? ected Moscow oligarchs more than their provincial counterparts. The Yeltsin oligarchy collapsed, but in the regions the merger of business and politics continued. The August crisis, in fact, accelerated the process. Ruined Moscow businessmen closed their regional o? ces; in turn, they were taken over by local administrations or by the companies they controlled. There was, in e? ect, a new redistribution of property in 1998e2000. Property was removed from its former owners in exchange for the cancellation of debts, in either of two forms: the return of ownership to the state itself (nationalisation), or the replacement of one private owner by another (reprivatisation). Both of these methods were actively employed by local leaderships throughout the federation. The velvet nationalisation of the post-crisis period took place under the guidance of local authorities. The ? rst experiment of this kind was carried out by Evgenii Mikhailov, governor of Pskov region who introduced a monopoly in the production and wholesale trade of alcohol (Slider, 1999). The ? rst state unitary enterprise ‘Pskovalko’ was established for these purposes. The model proved extremely e? ctive, and over the following year eight more such enterprises were established, including ‘Pskovobllesprom’, ‘Pskovtorf’, ‘Pskovvtorma’ and others. To assist the newly established state enterprises local enterprises were deprived of their productive assets in return for the cancellation of tax arrears. Regional tax inspectors were encouraged to identify as many of these indebted enterprises as possible, and defaulters were forced into bankrup tcy so that their property could be taken over by local state enterprisesdin e? ect, by local administrations. Mikhailov’s actions were so much to the advantage of local elites that his approach was immediately adopted throughout the country, leading to the establishment of large numbers of local monopolies modelled on the national gas and energy monopolies. It was not only local political leaderships that forced Moscow oligarchs out of the regions. Local entrepreneurs who were friendly with or even related to local 304 O. Kryshtanovskaya, S. White / Communist and Post-Communist Studies 38 (2005) 293e307 leaderships were also involved in the process. In Kursk, for instance, overnor Alexander Rutskoi handed the region’s network of chemists’ shops to his elder son Dmitrii, making him the general director of ‘Kurskpharmacy’. The governor’s younger son became a manager of the oil concern ‘Kurskneftekhim’, 49% of which was owned by a Moscow ? rm whose director was the same younger son. The governor’s brothers were also fortunate: the eld er became head of a state-joint stock company ‘Faktor’, and the younger became deputy head of the regional department of public security. The governor’s mother became the cofounder of a local ? m, and his father in law took over responsibility for the region’s cultural a? airs (these details are drawn from the National News Service at nns. ru). Reprivatisation and the strengthening of the local oligarchy have been taking place in all the Russian regions. It has acquired especially large dimensions in the national republics, where forms of authoritarian rule have become increasingly prominent. In Bashkortostan, to take another example, an entire clan of presidential relatives has come into existence. The president’s son, Ural Rakhimov, was vicepresident of the oil and gas company ‘Bashneftekhim’ in the early years of the new century; a relative of the president’s wife, Azat Kurmanaev, was president of ‘Bashkreditbank’; and the president’s wife, Luisa Rakhimov, held a senior position in the republic’s ministry of foreign relations and trade. The nationalisation of the Bashkir economy was also advancing rapidly, with the establishment of state monopolies in key spheres such as ‘Bashlesprom’ (timber), ‘Bashkirskaya toplivnaya kompaniya’ (fuel) and ‘Bashavtotrans’ (transportation) ( ns. ru). By 2000 the power of regional oligarchs had strengthened to such an extent that they began to expand economically in neighbouring regions. Regional oligarchs began to appear, with interests that spanned several of the subjects of the federation. In this process, new ? nancial and industrial groups came in to existence that had no connection with the ? rst-wave Moscow oligarchy. A striking example of this type was Aleksei Mordashov, general director of the ‘Severstal’’ joint stock company (based in Cherepovets in the Vologda region), who entered the list of the country’s most in? ential businessmen at the end of the 1990s. The same kind of interregional expansion was being carried out by entrepreneurs from Sverdlovsk and Samara regions, and Bashkortostan. New holding companies on a transregional scale that have emerged in recent years include the Urals mining and metallurgical company, Novolipets metallurgical combine, and the St Petersburg concern ‘New Programmes and Conceptions’. The increasing economic power of regional entrepreneurs was re? ected in their political in? uence. In local elections throughout the country it became apparent that electors preferred to vote for major businessmen, and for the directors of joint stock companies and of the region’s biggest factories. In the elections that took place in the late 1990s representatives of the industrial and ? nancial elite took 80% of seats in the Perm’ region, about 70% in Smolensk region, about 60% in Penza, Tambov and Tomsk regions, and more than half in Belgorod, Leningrad, Nizhnii Novgorod, Omsk, Rostov and Stavropol’ regions, and in Primorskii territory. The average, across all the regions that held their elections between 1995 and 1997, was 43% (calculated from Vybory, 1998). An increase in the political role of local oligarchs led O. Kryshtanovskaya, S. White / Communist and Post-Communist Studies 38 (2005) 293e307 305 at the same time to a fall in the electoral role of civil society. The more oligarchs and o? cials in local legislatures, the fewer teachers, doctors and farmers. The election of representatives of the ? ancial-industrial elite to representative institutions of this kind demonstrates that the tendency for regional capital and government to merge has become increasingly powerful. The increase in the in? uence of ? nancial-industrial circles in Russian towns and cities is paralleled by the increasing in? uence of state-farm directors in the countryside. As a result, in all regional legislatures the directors of joint stock companies, and of unitary enterprises, banks and other commercial structures, have become the dom inant force. New entrepreneurs, within this general tendency, have themselves become more numerous, squeezing out longer-established factory managers throughout the regions and especially where relatively large numbers of local enterprises are in ? nancial di? culty. Owners and managers, according to local legislation, are allowed to combine their entrepreneurial activities provided their representative duties are carried out on a part-time basis. In this way, they have obtained a series of legislative and supervisory prerogatives but at the same time been relieved of the burdens of full-time legislative duties. The increasing in? uence of business on regional politics is also apparent in the formation of local administrations. With every year, for instance, the number of businessmen-governors increases. The ‘? rst swallow’ was Kalmykia, where the wellknown entrepreneur Kirsan Ilyumzhinov was elected president as early as 1993. In 1996 three local oligarchs became governors: Yuri Evdokimov in Murmansk (where he had represented the interests of the Moscow mayor’s group ‘Sistema’), Leonid Gorbenko in Kaliningrad, and Vladimir Butov in the Nenets autonomous region. The elections of 2000e2001 added several more, including heads of the most important local enterprises: in Chukotka the head of Sibneft’ and owner of Chelsea Football Club, Roman Abramovich (in 2000); in Taimyr the head of Noril’sk Nickel, Alexander Khloponin (elected in 2001 and then a year later as governor of Krasnoyarsk territory); and in Evenki Boris Zolotarev, head of development at the oil giant ‘Yukos’ (in 2001). In Krasnodar territory, the Koryak autonomous district and Primor’e local oligarchs had further successes: Alexander Tkachev, Vladimir Loginov (December 2000) and Sergei Dar’kin (in 2001). In early 2002 there were two further successes of this kind, Vyacheslav Shtyrov won in Sakha (Yakutia), and Hazret Sovmen in Adygeya. As a result of these changes, 12 Russian regions (or nearly 14% of the total) are today headed by major businessmen. Conclusions Several new tendencies in the development of the Russian business elite had become apparent by the early years of the new century. 1. Powerful ? nancial-industrial groups have begun to appear that are based not in Moscow but in the Russian provinces, and which are furthering the process of inter-regional integration. At the same time the transfer of the business and 306 O. Kryshtanovskaya, S. White / Communist and Post-Communist Studies 38 (2005) 293e307 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. political activities of the business elite from the capital to the regions has been accompanied by an increase in the role of the state, which has taken steps to restore its control over political and economic life. The strengthening of the state has placed tighter limits on the business elite and restricted its freedom of activity, which has led to a reduction in its direct in? ence on the political process. This relates particularly to personnel matters, where the state has taken back the role of principal decision-maker, and to the mass media. By the early years of the new century the business elite were making fewer attempts to impose their own preferences upon government ‘from outside’, but were engaged in a process of interaction with all levels of government in which they could introduce their own priorities as issues were formulated and decisions were taken. From 1998 onwards there has been a further exclusion of Moscow capital from the regions and an increase in the concentration of power at the regional level. At the same time in a series of the republics the fusion of business and government has advanced even further, as has the formation of local oligarchies. Sometimes this process has assumed autocratic forms in which big business in a region has come under the absolute control not of the state, but of its leading o? cials, who have formed ? ancial-industrial clans enjoying an e? ective monopoly of political power. The interests of big business have changed. If before they were simply connected with privileges for their companies, now with the increase in the scale of their operation they have begun to press their views in relation to the regulation of the economy as a whole. This has led to an increase in the economic in? uence of private business, which has to some extent compensated for their loss of political in? uence. With the coming to power of Vladimir Putin in 2000 private entrepreneurs have begun to be excluded from the main electronic media. The destruction of the media holdings of Gusinsky and Berezovsky, and the arrest of Mikhail Khodorkovsky in late 2003, were intended to show ‘who’s boss’. The new regime made it clear it would not be blackmailed, as Boris Yeltsin had been; and formerly oppositional media were entrusted to groups that had shown their loyalty. In the period after the August 1998 crisis big business became a refuge for many retired politicians, with a substantial out? w of senior o? cials, ministers and civil servants into the managerial ranks of the major companies. Putin’s declared policy of ‘equal distancing’ for the oligarchs means a choice: either to support the regime in all its undertakings, or retire to the sidelines. No longer can Russia’s business elite establish their own parties and engage in open criticism of the go vernment. The new regime is engaged in restoring state power, after a period in which it had been privatised by o? cials and businessmen. In this new social order there is no place for opposition, unpredictable elections, or insubordinate nouveaux riches; rather, the preferred model is analogous to the cheibols in South Koreadenormous economic conglomerates whose activity is closely regulated. The further concentration of capital in the hands of 20e25 ? nancial-industrial groups that are completely loyal to the state appears to be the economic project of the Putin regime as it moves into its second and ? nal term of o? ce. O. Kryshtanovskaya, S. White / Communist and Post-Communist Studies 38 (2005) 293e307 307 References Ashin, G. K. , Ponedelkov, A. V. , Ignatov, V. G. , Starostin, A. M. , 1999. Osnovy Politicheskoi Elitologii. Prior, Moscow. Beard, M. , 1938. A History of the Business Man. Macmillan, New York. Chernysh, M. F. , 1994. Sotsial’naya mobil’nost’v 1986e1993 godakh. Sotsiologicheskii Zhurnal 2, 130e133. Eyal, G. , Szelenyi, I. , Townsley, E. , 1998. Making Capitalism without Capitalists: Class Formation and Elite Struggles in Post-Communist Central Europe. Verso, London. Freeland, C. , 2000. Sale of the Century. Little, Brown, London. Gill, G. , 1998. Democratization, the bourgeoisie and Russia. Government and Opposition 33 (3), 307e329. Ho? an, D. E. , 2002. The Oligarchs: Wealth and Power in the New Russia. Public A? airs, New York. K’eza, D. , 1997. Proshchai, Rossiya! Geya, Moscow. Khlebnikov, P. , 2000. Godfather of the Kremlin: Boris Berezovsky and the Looting of Russia. Harcourt, New York. Kukolev, I. V. , 1995a. Formirovanie rossiiskoi biznes-elity. Sotsiologicheskii Zhurnal 3, 159 e169. Kukolev, I. V. , 1995b. Sovremennaya biznes-elita Rossii. Vestnik Moskovskogo Universiteta, ser. 18: Sotsiologiya i Politologiya 4, 12e22. Kukolev, I. V. , 1996. Formirovanie biznes-elity. Obshchestvennye Nauki i Sovremennost’ 2, 12e23. Kryshtanovskaya, O. V. , 1996. Finansovaya oligarkhiya Rossii. Izvestiya 10 January, 5. Kryshtanovskaya, O. V. , 2002a. Biznes-elita i oligarkhi: itogi desyatiletiya. Mir Rossii 4, 3e60. Kryshtanovskaya, O. V. , 2002b. Transformatsiya biznes-elity Rossii: 1998e2002. Sotsiologicheskie Issledovaniya 8, 17e29. Martynova, M. Yu. , 2001. Politicheskaya elita Rossii na Rubezhe Vekov. Pomorskii Gosudarstvennyi Universitet, Archangel. Mawdsley, E. , White, S. , 2000. The Soviet Political Elite from Lenin to Gorbachev: The Central Committee and its Members, 1917e1991. Oxford University Press, Oxford. Michels, R. , 1959. Political Parties. Dover, New York. Mukhin, A. A. , 2001. Biznes-elita i Gosudarstvennaya vlast’. Gnom i D, Moscow. Mukhin, A. A. , 2004. ‘‘Osobaya Papka’’ Vladimira Putina. Itogi Pervogo Prezidentskogo Sroka i Otnosheniya s Krupnymi Sobstvennikami. Tsentr Politicheskoi Informatsii, Moscow. Osipov, G. V. (Ed. ), 1998. Rossiiskii Sotsiologicheskii Slovar’. Norma, Moscow. Pappe, Ya. Sh. , 2000. ‘Oligarkhi’: Ekonomicheskaya Khronika, 1992e2000. Vysshaya Shkola Ekonomiki, Moscow. Rutland, P. (Ed. ), 2001. Business and State in Contemporary Russia. Westview, Boulder, CO. Schroder, H. -H. , 1999. El’tsin and the oligarchs: the role of ? ancial groups in Russian politics between ? 1993 and July 1998. Europe-Asia Studies 51 (6), 957e988. Silverman, B. , Yanowitch, M. , 2000. New Rich, New Poor, New Russia: Winners and Losers on the Russian Road to Capitalism, expanded ed. Sharpe, Armonk NY. Slider, D. , 1999. Pskov under the LDPR: elections and dysfun ctional federalism in one region. EuropeAsia Studies 51 (5), 755e767. Toshchenko, Zh. T. , 1999. Elita? Klany? Kasty? Kliki? Kak nazvat’ tekh, kto pravit nami? Sotsiologicheskie Issledovaniya 11, 123e133. Vybory, 1998. Vybory v Zakonodatel’nye (Predstavitel’nye) Organy Gosudarstvennoi Vlasti Sub’’ektov Rossiiskoi Federatsii. 995e1997. Ves’ mir, Moscow. de Vries, M. K. , Shekshnia, S. , Korotov, K. , Florent-Treacy, E. , 2004. The New Russian Business Leaders. Edward Elgar, Cheltenham. Yeltsin, B. , 1992. ‘Vystuplenie’, (Vneocherednoi) S’’ezd Narodnykh Deputatov RSFSR 10e17 Iyunya, 28 Oktyabrya-2 Noyabrya 1991 Goda: Stenogra? cheskii Otchet 3 vols, vol. 2. Respublika, Moscow, pp. 4e30. Zaslavskaya, T. I. , 1997. Problema demokraticheskoi pereorientatsii ekonomiki sovremennoi Rossii. Obshchestvo i Ekonomika 1e2, 51e57. Zaslavskaya, T. I. , 2004. Sovremennoe Rossiiskoe Obshchestvo: Sotsial’nyi Mekhanizm Transfo rmatsii. Delo, Moscow.

Fashion PR Article Example | Topics and Well Written Essays - 2000 words

Fashion PR - Article Example The present paper endeavors to critically analyze the applicability of known dictums in public relations to the fashion industry after carefully understanding the development of public relations in the industry from earlier times in history. The development of public relations strategies in fashion industry came about around the 1930s, when members of the elite and wealthy class could afford to select and pick designer wearables like garments, gowns, wigs, glasses, bracelets, umbrellas and so on. By then, distinct fashion magazines were already available in print in the urban society and photos were being printed to create cover pages for the magazines. Fashion was not just restricted to apparels and what a person wore, but was also found in home dà ©cor and accessories. By the 1960s, a more important trend of identifying and portraying the volatility of the industry began and is popular till today. Amongst the first examples of use of public relation strategy in promoting fashion p roducts, we find a localization of power as a particular news house would ask members of its elite class or Hollywood actors and actresses who are members of the book house or publishing house to wear creations of known designer members of the same society, at events and functions where they would get noticed and clicked. This way, the publishing houses hoped to keep glamour and glitz showcased on people associated with them. One such example is seen when Eleanor Lambert in 1950 asks Joan Crawford to sport.

The Implication of Cultural Diversity in American schools Essay

The Implication of Cultural Diversity in American schools - Essay Example majority of the population diversity was white alone that was represented 72% while the minority was American Indian and Alaska Native represented 0.9%. However, the African American census made up about 13% and the Hispanics numbering totaled 16%. The Asian population increased faster than other groups. Despite the changes in the education sector within the last decade, we still needed to concentrate the ethnic diversity in classrooms. That means we cannot eradicate the immigration’s issues by segregated the students, on the contrary; it is most significant to integrate different cultural ethnic. Actually, the educator must have various styles of teaching that he/she will have to educate children from different backgrounds and beliefs. So that, the teachers and the education programs with each other can work to create modify which is helpful for the different groups of learner in the schools. No doubt, educators will face some challenges to educate different students from dif ferent cultures (De 88). In retrospect, cultural diversity in American schools is the surest way of eliminating cultural discrimination since learners grow up into holistic individuals who appreciate cultural diversity in the society. As the students interact among themselves, they overcome some of the existing stereotypes thereby create social circles that are culturally diverse. This way, they share values and learn to respect each other despite the diversities in their respective cultures. Every cultural group always uses its cultural values to judge other cultures a feature that may often lead to discrimination (Phelan 76). With cultural diversity on the other hand, the students experience other cultures thus creating a cohesive system especially given the fact that schools just as any other organization often create systematic organizational

Environmental issues and policies in Madagascar Essay Example for Free

Environmental issues and policies in Madagascar Essay With the world’s population growing constantly and with human needs and desires growing pretty fast, we feel like every year there is less and less room for us to live on and it takes more and more effort for us to calmly and amicably share room and resources with our neighbors. In fact, it is too early to speak about global overpopulation, since there are still vast expanses of yet uninhabited land, to say nothing of the ability of humans, with the help of innovative technological facilities, to promptly acclimatize under extreme conditions. However, in many countries (particularly in third-world countries) some emigrational tendencies that are mostly dictated by economic and social factors, are creating quite a plausible picture of our future world, revealing the most likely and formidable phenomena we may face in future. Some large cities are experiencing serious problems related to rapidly increasing inflow of countrymen who, for various reasons, are forced to leave countryside and look for a better life in cities. Over the past few decades, most economies have been developing in such a way as to provide propitious conditions for rapid urbanization. Industrial development plus numerous revolutionary technological breakthroughs that took place in the twentieth century have resulted in the appearance of large factories. The growing demand for paid workforce has attracted country dwellers, leading to massed withdrawal of human resources from rural areas. In terms of personal affluence, the concentration of social and economic activity in the city has made urban environment more attractive and promising. Although governments of some countries have realized the danger of such economic tilts, most rural lands are still experiencing severe shortage of financial support resulting in persistent skepticism of many people about life in the countryside. It is to say, that it takes a lot of innovative thinking and political will on the part of a government to balance out the local economy, as well as the realization of the fact that harsh mandatory or administrative measures imposed on people to make them stay in rural areas alone will not suffice. It will be not before we manage to create economically healthy and prosperous environment in the village that we shall be able to speak about things in the countryside taking a turn for the better. We have considered the negative of withdrawal of human, financial, industrial and technological resources from the village from the standpoint of rural life. This long-lasting tendency seems to be making it hot for cities too. In many cities, especially in world capitals, unending inflow of immigrants seeking wealthy and prospect, has contributed to rapid and uncontrolled population growth, resulting in tough and fierce competition in the sphere of management and acute contradictions between management and hired staff, entailing collisions of interests, progressive social stratification and environmental deterioration. All this has led to a number of doubtful achievements and hazards, which appear to be making city life far less comfortable than it used to be a short while ago. Today, Mexico city is the world’s largest capital, counting about 22 million people. Mexico is a large industrial city, and it appears to be sharing the fate of most industrial centers of the world, barely coping with the influx of countrymen. The acceptance by the Mexican government of certain trading rules in line with international agreements, a paramount condition of the country’s participation in the WTO, has impacted rural economy, causing a dramatic economic collapse in the agricultural sector, resulting from the imbalance between local prices and those imposed by WTO regulations. This has triggered a new spate of internal migration from the countryside to the city. Unfortunately, problems that the city of Mexico has accumulated by now are not limited to overpopulation. It is not the overpopulation itself that poses most serious difficulties, but also ineffectual measures taken by the city government. To say the least, with the inflow so intensive and so evident, the city’s townplanning committee does not seem to be fully taking into account the migration problem, or they simply fail to keep pace with the time. The city infrastructure fails to keep up with the population increase, so people arriving in Mexico take up residence in shabby makeshift homes on the city’s outskirts or in slum districts. These districts lack water and gas supply, sewage, electricity, services, etc. , and there are no advanced waste disposal systems whatsoever. This has resulted in absolutely unfavorable environmental and epidemiologic conditions. Most of garbage and human wastes remain on or close to the surface of the earth, and large parts of it are carried by winds for miles away and into the city. Unsanctioned dumping may spoil water and cause massed poisonings or outbreaks of infection. This in turn directly affects the quality of the food, increasing the risk of its contamination with harmful substances and bacteria. There is another menacing phenomenon resulting from uncontrolled population growth and topped off by the city’s geographic position. Permanent release of carbodyoxide by factories, coupled with the release of automobile waste gases is putting the city on the brink of suffocation. Statistically, automobile emissions make up about 60% of all emissions, and, considering the increasing vehicle ownership, there seems to be no way to reduce automobile emissions. The realization that internal combustion is the greatest contributor to the accumulation of emission gases in the atmosphere has prompted automobile designers to equip vehicles with catalytic converters, but today there are too few such cars to make the effect palpable. The city is placed on a plateau fenced off with high mountain ranges. The cold air arriving from behind the mountains forms a cap over the whole valley preventing the warm and stuffed city air from getting away. This lack of natural convection contributes to the accumulation of harmful emissions in the area and may turn the whole place into a gigantic gas van. The continuing economic growth, extensive factory development and ever-growing population in Mexico City are aggravating the pollution problem. The accumulation of heavy metals in the air can undermine peoples’ health and result in serious progressive hereditary diseases, increasing the occurrence of cancer, chronic poisoning, high infant mortality, cardiovascular diseases, allergic reactions, innate orthopedic malformations, poor cognition and many other physical and mental abnormalities. Progressive intake of harmful substances directly affects the nation’s genetic makeup, and it is hardly possible now to precisely foresee all consequences of these destructive influences. Active use of depths of the earth, resulting from ever-bulging demand for minerals and oil has triggered rapid and unpredictable underground processes, resulting in unstable aquifers and causing much water to go deeper into the ground, making it less reachable. As long as the city is situated in a seismologically unstable region with an active volcano in its direct proximity, further deterioration of the bed may result in disastrous earthquakes, which, in turn, are likely to wake up the volcano and plunge the whole area into an apocalyptic calamity. Apart from the destruction of the bedrock, destruction of aquifers is fraught with the disappearance of water in some places and appearance of excessive amounts of it in others. This may cause lack of water supply and actual drying out of some areas and lead to unexpected floods elsewhere. The formation of empty spaces in the bed has caused some areas to sink significantly over the past few decades, which increases the possibility of flooding. At the same time, the emptying of the aquifers due to extraneous consumption of water by the growing city has led to a dramatic reduction of natural water resources, threatening to leave the whole city without water in the foreseeable future. According to last estimates, every second the city of Mexico takes 7,250 gallons of water, which amounts to an Olympic-size swimming pool per minute. With the consumption of water so intensive, there is a grave possibility that the amount of water remaining in the aquifers will be insufficient. Needless to say, this is much more serious a threat that inability to afford a car or a TV. In some areas, shortage of water is already tangible, and it has resulted in social upheavals. Changes in bedrock structure and the progressive subsidence of the ground can also result in the destruction of sewer and drainage systems, increasing the risk of contaminating fresh water and thus threatening to impair its quality. As we can see, all the aforementioned threats arise from one major phenomenon – overpopulation. Needless to say, increasingly intensive use of water and resources is attributable to population growth and human thirst for relative prosperity and every individual’s desire to occupy his or her niche in the booming economy. However, this brief outline of most significant problems and dilemmas shows that if we continue to use natural resources in the current fashion, the place we live in will soon become absolutely unlivable. In this respect, the city of Mexico can be presented as a small replica of our entire planet, which, with the same tendencies and phenomena persisting, will soon be confronted with similar problems. There is less and less room for industrial and vehicle emission gases and, like it is with the aquifers under Mexico city, the increasing encroachment upon minerals and oil resources is affecting the earth’s bedrock, creating pre-conditions for unpredictable and destructive earthquakes and massive destruction. With the situation so serious and menacing tendencies so evident, many governmental authorities of Mexico City, as well as state authorities express their concern about the country’s future and come up with lots of ideas, which are likely to prove helpful and effective in overcoming these negative tendencies. Whichever idea is the best, just one thing is evident today, and this is the necessity to create positive incentives and favorable conditions for people to live and work in the countryside in order to stem the growth of city population. As air quality issue appears to be the most evident one, the city government has developed a number of solutions aimed at reduction of industrial and vehicle releases into the atmosphere. By incorporating advanced technological systems and usage of higher quality fuel, it is possible to significantly improve air quality. Recently, a state-of-the-art air quality monitoring system has been implemented, so government officials and specialists have obtained control over air quality. Now every vehicle is required to feature advanced converting devices that are capable to cut down the release of toxic substances. In November 1989, the city Government introduced the so called No Driving Day (NDD), when car owners are supposed not to use their vehicles on certain days. The results of this innovation were a considerable reduction of traffic congestion and gasoline use. The use of refined types of fuel and the installation of waste gas purification and vapor recovery equipment are innovative measures regulated by the Clear Air Act Amendments of 1990. Hypothetically, these measures can be instrumental in reducing the amount of vehicle-related chemicals in the air and thus improve air quality. However, these ideas, though effective theoretically, have proven less feasible in reality. As a rule, advanced technological solutions are something than few people can afford, and most people find it less expensive to bribe authorized inspection employees and use old vehicles than purchasing new automobiles or applying expensive technologies. Not infrequently, the cost of implementing new equipment exceeds the size of fines by far, so people prefer to pay fines rather than spend money on equipment. For this reason, the results of the latest innovations have turned out to be less tangible than expected. The NDD policy has also revealed a number of unexpected actions on people’s side. Instead of increased usage of public transportation, Mexico City dwellers found a way around it by purchasing more vehicles in order to have a reserve automobile to be used on No Driving Days. Actually, this nullified the immediate positive tendencies that showed during initial stages of the NDD policy. Other attempts to limit air pollution include increased vehicle ownership taxation and boosting the price of fuels. The advocates of these measures believed that this would discourage people from using cars and thus reduce the impact on the environment. All these measures have proven less effective than expected, since most Mexico residents simply cannot afford new vehicles, to which the new regulations actually spread, and prefer to use old vehicles without having to purchase new equipment. Now, having discussed a few measures that have been taken over the last several years in an attempt to solve the ecological problem, we can see that they are not always applicable or effective. As there is just one major problem that all these issues stem from – the overpopulation – all efforts to change things for the better must be concentrated on solving overpopulation problem. Although mandatory measures, such as inspections, bans, taxation and can have a temporary effect, there is no way to achieve significant improvement in air and water quality but by using wise economical and political instruments. Once again, in order to encourage city dwellers to move to rural areas, healthy economic environment must be created in agricultural regions. This is only feasible through establishing price standards acceptable for country dwellers and creating an ample ground for agricultural business. In other words, in order to stop the growth of city population, we have to make the village no less livable than the city. Unfortunately, very little is being done to improve life in the country, since it would take a decision by the Mexican government to unilaterally withdraw from the WTO, which can entail a conflict with the USA, the founder of the WTO. Today, the Mexican government still prefers to use doubtful methods of forcing the poor to leave the city – by raiding their encampments, as it did in the late 1990s. 1. Phil Hearse. â€Å"MEXICO CITY Environmental Crisis, Socialist Solutions. Environment and Urbanization, Vil. 11, No 1, 53-78 (1999) 2. Ramiro Tovar Landa, 1995. â€Å"Mobile Source Pollution in Mexico City and Market-Based Alternatives† Published by the Cato Institute. Editorial and business offices are located at 1000 Massachusetts Avenue, N. W. , Washington, D. C. , 20001

Free Huckleberry Finn Essays: Race Relations :: Adventures Huckleberry Huck Finn Essays

Adventures of Huckleberry Finn Race Relations  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚   Humans are fascinated with real life situations, tagged in with fictional story line.   Mark Twain’s novel, The Adventures of Huckleberry Finn, describes real life situations, in a fictional story line perfectly.   Twain put the real life happenings of slavery, in a fun and fictional story.   The novel is mainly about the racial relations between each human.   Classes of society, loyalty/friendship, and rebellion shows how the novel evolves into a main theme of Race Relations.      Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚   Throughout the history of the world, people have been placed into categories based on their wealth, and all of the worldly possessions that we have.   These classes of society can really make people talk, and act differently towards some people.   In The Adventures of Huckleberry Finn, the novel shows these classes really well.   In the beginning of the novel, we see a little bit of the black class, and how they were treated.   â€Å"Miss. Watson’s big nigger, named Jim, was setting in the kitchen door, we could see him pretty clear† (14).   Jim, Miss. Watson’s run away slave in the story, is part of the black class.   We see the sub ordinance that blacks were placed in America, because blacks were not allowed to be in the house, because they were uneducated, and had to be working in the fields.      Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚   Another example of the classes we put each other into is when Huck, the main character, and Jim were heading south.   Jim and Huck are sitting on the banks of the Mississippi River, and Jim says â€Å"I owns myself en I’s wuth eight hund’d dollars.† (54).   This shows the reader that blacks are so low, that the white people place prices on the blacks.   As uneducated as the blacks are, they believe they are worth so much money, because that is all they hear from their owners.   By doing such a thing to another human being, that degrades our country, and the black citizens themselves.      Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚   At the end, we see how these classes can effect one person, due to his social status.   Like before, people say things to other people, to make themselves feel better, and they do not care what it does to the person they are talking about, because of their class in society.   One example of this is when â€Å"They cussed Jim considerably, though, and give him a cuff or two upside the head† (271).

How to establish the communication Essay

Everyone has different needs and styles in which they communicate. There are also many different ways in which we may establish these communication needs, wishes and preferences. A good way to begin to understand a patient’s needs, wishes and preferences is to read their notes and history’s to see if this contains any relevant information. For example, if I read that a patient has hearing problems, I would then know to make sure that I speak to the patient clearly and slowly and look at them so they can read my lips. Other ways to establish communication needs, wishes and preferences is by interacting with the patient and through conversation I learn how to best communicate with the patient. It is also important to remember to be clear and concise in all forms of communication, especially when working with people with learning disabilities, where they might get confused if I speak too quickly or use too complex language. It may benefit, if this is the case, to use your body language to help explain what you are trying to say and to emphasise the tone of the conversation. Also, pictures can be used to help the patient and myself understand. For example, one of my patients uses cards that display what emotions they are feeling, they will use these to communicate how they are feeling. In the past, I have worked with a patient who is deaf. For me to establish what her needs were, I first spoke to the nurse in charge and they informed me she was deaf, however, could sign or write things down. As I could not sign, our preferred form of communication was writing, which after spending time together worked quite well.

Discuss critically on Age Diversity Management programs in organisations - Free Essay Example

Sample details Pages: 8 Words: 2406 Downloads: 4 Date added: 2017/06/26 Category Management Essay Type Analytical essay Did you like this example? Diversity may be defined as the presence of differences among members of a social unit and is viewed as a significant factor in social life as countries worldwide become more diverse in terms of the gender, race, ethnicity, age, and national origins (Murray, Karim Fisher 2010, p. 193). Organisations can benefit from workforce diversity by attracting more people from diverse communities regardless of their cultural and ethnic background, age and gender. There are many new benefits like good pay, job security, promotion within the industry of diversified and enhance effectiveness of workforce in Australian organisations where the number of migrants in the workforce from Asia and European countries have increased and especially Gen Y is attracted towards Australia and working in corporate firms and other industries to fill the shortage of skills demand in Australia. More Gen Y is being attracted towards Australia and everyone willing to take advantage of high profile jobs i n the market. From an example we can see in Australia more police officers from different backgrounds have enhanced effectiveness in serving the community where English is their second language and one should be more interactive towards the community. There have been problems in recruiting and retaining the staff with Victoria Police due to diverse backgrounds, but now with proper induction and training people are being retained and encouraged to work with Victoria Police. People from all age groups are being encouraged to apply to Victoria Police and serving the community in best possible way and recruiting the best, but in recent years Gen Y is more attracted towards jobs with Victoria Police. Also people working from different backgrounds and more Gen Y being recruited into the workforce which fulfills the need for better management and overcome other issues such as performance and development that organisations faces (Murray, karim Fisher 2010). Khan et al. (2010) describes diversity in the workplace requires careful management practices and understanding to help the organisation achieve their needs and goals and everyone working in the business meeting their KPIs (Key performance indicators). Some of the elements related to the diversity are commitment to the organisation, respect and fairness and these are found to be correlated to personal attributes to diversity in the workplace. People working at different organisations will have better understanding of how to achieve more positive attitudes to diversity and thus, improve group dynamics in the workplace by targeting these intervening variables in HR policies. The dimensions of diversity include gender, race, culture, age, family/career status, religion, disability, educational qualifications, work experience, languages, and other relevant attributes and experiences that differentiate individuals (Khan et al. 2010, p.290). Khan et al. (2010) suggest that teams that are ethnically diverse do not pro duce benefits but teams which are gender balanced do bring great benefits and has positive team performance outcome. There are some perspectives like integration and learning perspectives outcomes for a diversity policy that provides positive outcomes. There can be different perceptions in different cultures, whether its Gen Y or Baby boomers coming from different backgrounds everyone working towards a problem solving situation leads to great performance. In todays century understanding cultural differences is an important factor in diversity management. If one is comfortable working with people whose age, gender, ethnicity and religion are different to each other, managers have a fair attitude towards them and this ensure employees openly express their concerns about their environment. If there is misunderstanding, lack of communication and language problems teams will suffer more which affects motivation and job performance. (Khan et al.2010) The findings provide useful criteri a for organisational development strategies to assist with the transition from higher education to the workforce and may also improve the success of recruiting Gen Y employees (Hurst Good 2009, p.570). We can see in the retail industry which is the largest facing the challenge of attracting, recruiting and retaining a competent workforce. Retail employment has higher turnover than any other industry and Gen Y are moving towards this industry, which attracts them with positions like retail management, media executives, supervisors, sales personnel, corporate executive. There is a lot of competition between Gen Y but the brightest candidates are being taken up for different roles. In the current trend of diversity management Gen Y are more likely to survive in this increasingly diverse population and workforce. Even university students studying part time or full time prefer working in retail as their first preference and gradually moving on towards managerial roles which they develop through experience. It not only builds their inner motivation towards working at retail but also gain valuable working experience towards retail industry. In the time of economic expansion Gen Y has raised and wants to succeed and seek professional employers for their better growth. Gen Y persuading a career in retail and those who are currently employed in retail stores expects enjoyable work, develop new skills and enjoy good pay. Those employees who are more flexible in adjusting human resource strategies are able to find successful candidates starting from entry retail job, moving up towards different retail careers. (Hurst Good 2009). Looking at the age diversity whether its Gen Y or Baby boomers one should follow the workforce plan for age diversity management and should be an integrated part of the planning process. A workforce plan should include a clear statement of what it is trying to achieve, its details, as well as expected benefits and risks. It covers a wide rang e of activities from individual up to national and international organisations (Curson et al. 2010, p.112). It is being implemented to follow the procedures correctly and accurately and it is adopted by many private sector organisations worldwide as more of Gen Y is coming to the workforce. To achieve gains a workforce resource needs to be used effectively. Demographic factors are crucial to workforce planning. The large corporate companies ensures best graduates are supplied which have strong links with the education sector that carried out workforce planning (Curson et al. 2010) This study shows that multigenerational family firms are an excellent example of age diversity because they have more centralized decision-making in the first generation than in the generations following (Carter Justis 2010, p. 564). Carter Justis (2010) describes family firms are having a significant impact on todays management as business is being carried from one generation to the next and the abil ity to pass the elements of controlling ownership and controlling management. This Study shows multigenerational family members have a great impact on multigenerational family firms as the person is responsible for the continuity of the business. The employees are loyal to the firm and also there is high degree of commitment among family members. Teaching and training is always there to overcome any problems and most of the time success depends on following the dictatorial management styles in which to achieve goals and events. The family firms take effective decisions and control and support those decisions. Some owners in the business see retirement as a loss of power and status but in the business founder retains a significant role. There should be necessary experience, performance and skills for leading the firm. The newcomers who enter the family have to acquire special knowledge and to develop their capabilities. Key components in running an organisation and being a leader amo ng successors are self awareness, influence skills, technical skills and knowledge of the industry. Family firms also show they are more diverse within their business. In successful family business there is more communication and its faster and deeper as the individuals involved know each other better (Carter Justis 2010) As looking on age diversity management Older workers cognitive performance and job attitudes compare adversely to their younger colleagues (Brough et al. 2011, p.105). Brough et al. (2011) describes younger workers are highly skilled in comparison to older colleagues. There are assumptions concerning inadequate performance and low job commitment commonly attributed towards older workers. The main priority is to effectively manage the ageing workforce and ensure economic sustainability for the growing retired population. Factors driving the expansion of a maturing workforce include the ageing of the baby boomer generation, declining fertility rates and increased life expectancy (Brough et al. 2011, p.106). Some of the ageing workers tend to remain in the workforce as due to the financial crisis and economic necessity. There are concerns of declining older workers as Gen Y capture the market of the new mature workforce. There is concern as after the age of 65 and older and with higher life expectancies and a diminishing workforce unable to fully support these retirees. As also the loss of skills and expertise creates a big impact on older workers and there are assumptions that old workers are being less able to cope with changes, being less productive, and are less healthy too. Also with old workers work productivity tends to fall from time to time which results decline in performance and physical capacities. This study shows clearly that Gen Y is more likely to capture the market in the workforce and able to fulfill the employer needs where old workers are less preferred (Brough et al. 2011) The organisations that manage employee divers ity effectively may gain a competitive advantage. An important outcome of a good employee diversity management is increased innovativeness of employees (Treven Mulej 2006, p. 144). Treven Mulej (2007) describes employees who belong to the same professional, age, gender group have similar patterns of behavior. Also effective management diversity and employee differences can add value to the company. It has been observed that the culture in the organisation and the working environment issues are concerns of employee diversity management. Employee diversity management must be based on a co-operation between managers and co workers. Regardless of age, gender or race, employee diversity entails enabling people to perform at their best and it focuses on changing an organisations culture and infrustucture so that highest possible productivity can be achieved. Its been discovered that from all around the world labour forces are becoming diverse, and it gives organisations gain competitive advantage and also it gives Gen Y a chance to explore different opportunities. Employee diversity management can cause creativity, innovation, increased group problem solving, increased sales, lower costs and improved employee attitudes. As employees are the valuable assets of the organisation their knowledge and experiences have to be considered carefully as an effective employee diversity management scheme, as this can influence organisational costs, profits, problem solving and creativity and looking all this factors in mind organisations tend to hire Gen Y from different backgrounds (Treven, Mulej 2006) The purpose of this paper is to assess risks and prospects for older workers and to provide a number of recommendations designed to marshal the interests of employees, business and government. To improve the quality of staff training by means of the learning management system and to build, through blended learning a community of practice among multigenerational staff among d ifferent educational levels and background (Fontanin 2010, p.15). Looking at an example of libraries in universities which are composed of twelve different libraries coming from different departments and faculties until they were grouped into one single system, many of the library assistants are employed for cataloguing and other services. Now the need for libraries is a simple unified centralised service. Often it is the older generations who lack specific education and has to work with qualified people to build a common base of values and goals. People of different age groups work together as Gen Y and baby boomers working collaboratively to offer the services at different locations. People working at libraries have different work values due to differences in age, but also they have their different working conditions, professional experience and educational backgrounds. By blending the service into one system and being more centralised, the library staff can apply skills quickly a nd more efficiently to their daily work and Gen Y and older workers can work together more efficiently and effectively (Fontanin 2010) Jorgensen and Taylor (2008) describes the relationship between demographic ageing, the labour market and economic globalisation in the context of globalisation. In this 21st century we can see a greater change in demographics like birth rates are declining, greater longevity and most of the ageing population. With the emergence of new technology there is sharp change in social, economic and cultural change. We can see that there is a new trend towards ageing population and it raises issues about the management of ageing workforces. Of concern, in western industrialised nations these demographic shifts are predicted to result in labour market skill shortages (Ernst Young, 2006; National Statistics, 2006; Office for an Ageing Australia, 2001). Reports from Governments and institutions in Australia (DEWR, 2005), the USA (Government Accountability Office, 2005: National Academy of Engineering., 2006), the OECD (2000), the ILO (Auer and Fortuny, 2000) and in Europe have each, to name a few, noted that demographic change poses serious challenges for employers and economies in the developed world (Jorgensen and Taylor 2008, p. 24) From this literature review and discussing on age diversity management programs in organisations we can draw a conclusion that blended workforce that reflects diversity could actually be an asset when trying to build cohesion among a multigenerational workforce. It is necessary that the learning experience is carefully planned and the themes treated are related to work experience, because the factor which above all draws different workers together seems to be solving real-world problems. It shows that Gen Y is more preferred in todays world as younger generation tends to bring skills, knowledge, abilities to the workforce. In some instances Gen Y and older people work together efficiently and effec tively to achieve profitable results but older generation tends to lack skills after a particular age and Gen Y comes into the workforce. Also diversity plays an important role in todays world and is being considered when recruiting as it gives a fair go to all people who coming into workforce and tends to bring different skills and abilities. Regardless of age, gender or race diversity entails people to perform at their best. Even businesses are passed from generation to generation as it tends to work in a more centralised manner and there is commitment between family members. One should follow a workforce plan indicating procedures correctly and accurately and it is adopted by many private sector organisations worldwide as more of Gen Y is coming to the workforce. All these above factors are crucial to age diversity management as looking on from all perspectives working conditions, age, organisation value, family businesses and their operations. Don’t waste time! Our writers will create an original "Discuss critically on Age Diversity Management programs in organisations" essay for you Create order